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Negative shocks predict 
change in cognitive function 
and preferences: assessing 
the negative affect and stress 
hypothesis
Francesco Bogliacino 1,2*, Cristiano Codagnone3,4,5, Felipe Montealegre1,2, 
Frans Folkvord4,6, Camilo Gómez1,2, Rafael Charris2,7, Giovanni Liva4, 
Francisco Lupiáñez‑Villanueva4,5 & Giuseppe A. Veltri8
In the context of the current COVID‑19 pandemic, households throughout the world have to cope with 
negative shocks. Previous research has shown that negative shocks impair cognitive function and 
change risk, time and social preferences. In this study, we analyze the results of a longitudinal multi‑
country survey conducted in Italy (N = 1652), Spain (N = 1660) and the United Kingdom (N = 1578). 
We measure cognitive function using the Cognitive Reflection Test and preferences traits (risk, time 
and social preferences) using an experimentally validated set of questions to assess the differences 
between people exposed to a shock compared to the rest of the sample. We measure four possible 
types of shocks: labor market shock, health shock, occurrence of stressful events, and mental health 
shock. Additionally, we randomly assign participants to groups with either a recall of negative events 
(more specifically, a mild reinforcement of stress or of fear/anxiety), or to a control group (to recall 
neutral or joyful memories), in order to assess whether or not stress and negative emotions drive 
a change in preferences. Results show that people affected by shocks performed worse in terms of 
cognitive functioning, are more risk loving, and are more prone to punish others (negative reciprocity). 
Data do not support the hypotheses that the result is driven by stress or by negative emotions.
As a consequence of the current COVID-19 pandemic, an enormous number of households around the globe 
have been negatively hit by different shocks; either health related, as a result of the disease itself or as an obliga-
tion to postpone treatments, or economically related, due to the cost of the various mitigation strategies in terms 
of shutdowns, layoffs and the exit of  firms1,2. Negative shocks are defined as losses of income or accumulated 
assets and can be classified according to the source of the loss; namely, health, labor market, natural disaster, 
and poverty, amongst others.
This study analyzes the relationship between having suffered negative shocks and individual cognitive func-
tioning and preferences, including time and risk preferences (i.e., risk aversion and time discounting), and 
social preferences. Cognitive function is defined as the capacity of an individual to solve tasks for which relying 
on intuition and instinct is not a reliable guide and so reflection is needed. These tasks include reasoning (fluid 
intelligence), working memory (storing and processing information) and cognitive control (the ability to inhibit 
external or internal stimuli from distracting, and the flexibility to move from one task to another)3,4. Risk aver-
sion is defined as the willingness to accept certain amounts in exchange for lotteries for which the expected 
value is  larger5,6. Furthermore, time discounting is a measure of the willingness to give up something today in 
exchange for a larger sum  tomorrow7. Finally, social preference means showing other-regarding concerns when 
OPEN
1Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Kr 30, No 45-03, Bogotá, Colombia. 2Centro 
de Investigaciones Para El Desarrollo, Bogotá, Colombia. 3Università Degli Studi Di Milano, Milan, Italy. 4Open 
Evidence Research, Milan, Italy. 5Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain. 6Tillburg School of Humanities 
and Digital Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. 7Economic Science Institute, Chapman 




Scientific Reports |         (2021) 11:3546  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-83089-0
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
it is costly and does not depend upon strategic considerations: examples are altruism and reciprocity in distribu-
tive choices, following social norms, participating in the community, and partaking in cooperative behavior in 
social  interactions8.
Decision making depends on preferences, beliefs, and constraints, and occurs using scarce cognitive resources 
to process information to produce actual  choices9,10. As a result, cognitive function and preferences are of the 
utmost importance to understand how having suffered shocks changed which decisions are being taken regarding 
searching for jobs, the management of savings, consumption activities, collective actions, etc., and the aggregate 
implications of the pandemic and the lockdown for our societies and our economies. In particular, understand-
ing a change in cognitive function makes it possible to predict the likelihood of making suboptimal decisions; a 
change in risk preferences allows predicting decisions under uncertain scenarios; time discounting guides us in 
the understanding of savings and other intertemporal decisions (e.g., education); and finally, social preferences 
help us to anticipate how households and persons will trust, cooperate, donate, and in general, participate in 
the life of the community.
The previous literature has studied negative shocks because they are experienced during the course of a life-
time for a variety of reasons; for example, because of macroeconomic volatility or natural  events11–14. These shocks 
are usually mild, and to some extent more expected and perceived as part of life, because modern economies have 
developed a variety of market and social policy mechanisms to insure an individual’s consequences from these 
shocks, such as unemployment subsidies. Shocks have also been studied in developing countries where poverty 
and violence are widespread, and both are associated with  shocks15–18, where the institutional environment is less 
capable of absorbing these shocks and instead leaves households at their mercy. More generally, both developing 
and developed countries are less resilient to aggregate and correlated shocks (shocks that hit many households 
at the same time and in the same direction), in which case market insurance mechanisms are absent and the 
government may face financing constraints. This is a further reason to investigate the consequences of the situ-
ation that is currently unfolding due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the various mitigation strategies in place.
Studies have shown that economic shocks have a negative impact on cognitive function and a positive impact 
on time discounting, risk aversion and social preferences. To begin with the effect of shocks on cognitive function, 
some of the evidence comes from laboratory experiments where shocks are induced as losses over a Real Effort 
 Task19, and where shocks are measured as large income windfalls for sugar cane farmers in rural  India16. No 
effect was found for paycheck natural  variations20, although in the latter case the shock is temporary, expected, 
and expected to be temporary.
Time discounting and risk aversion are also increased when people face losses in controlled laboratory 
 experiments21. Decker and  Schimtz22 find a similar result for health shock and risk aversion, although in this 
case the authors rely on matching over observables characteristics and causal interpretation is less credible. Voors 
et al23 document increasing time discounting, but more risk-loving behaviors in the case of negative shocks 
associated with violence in Burundi, using an instrumental variable strategy.
Finally, social preferences have been studied either in a class of standard strategic interactions (e.g., trust 
games, gift exchange, ultimatum game, dictator game), where a subset of participants face plausible naturally 
occurring exogenous shocks or in quasi-experimental studies where partaking in the community, electoral 
participation and other community involvement is studied in situations in which there is a gradient in terms 
of exposure to shocks. Studies on the effects of natural disasters show an increase in pro-sociality24,25, and the 
literature on conflict related violence finds an increase in pro-sociality26 and an increase in  reciprocity27. One 
study has shown that when pure endowment shocks are induced in a two-person trust game, people become less 
pro-social, however in this case, inequality is more salient than shock because the focus is on the comparison 
of the endowments between the two counterparts and arguably the latter (rather than the former) is driving the 
 results28. Other studies have shown that anti-social behavior after negative shocks occur variously, due to rainfall 
variations in  Germany29, grapevine diseases in nineteenth century  France30, the collapse of financial  schemes31, 
and trade  shocks32; with the finding that under weak institutions, shocks drive anti-social behavior. This latter 
strand seems to be at odds with the rest of the literature and will be addressed in the Discussion.
Plausible theoretical explanations for the cognitive impact of negative shocks include scarcity, stress, and 
negative emotions. According to the scarcity hypothesis, negative shocks tax mental bandwidth, reducing cog-
nitive control and fluid intelligence. According to an alternative hypothesis, stress (i.e., the condition by which 
environmental demands exceed the regulatory capacity of the body) decreases performance according to evidence 
from  mammals33 due to alterations in the neuroendocrine network that may affect the prefrontal  cortex34,35. For 
the third hypothesis, it is assumed that negative emotions operate through a similar  mechanism15, in particular 
negative emotions activate the amygdala that may trigger a number of automatic reactions overcoming cognitive 
control and fluid intelligence.
For the impact of shocks on risk and time preferences, Haushofer and  Fehr36 reviewed the literature on nega-
tive affect, stress, risk aversion, and time discounting. In the included studies, stress and negative affect were 
administered in placebo-controlled experiments through fear induction, minor electric shocks, or the supply of 
hydrocortisone. The results showed that these negative shocks increased time discounting and risk aversion (the 
result is not replicated in Kassas et al37, though). A correlational study by Nguyen and  Noussair38 showed that 
negative emotions are associated with risk aversion. Since stress and negative affect are increased by negative 
shocks, stress and negative emotions are plausible mechanisms to explain why exposure to shock may change 
time and risk preferences.
Finally, to search for plausible explanations for the effect of negative shocks on social preferences, we can 
look to the literature that has documented an increase in pro-social behavior after exposure to violence related 
shocks (reviewed in Bauer et al26). It is argued that this effect may be due to a reassessment of individual beliefs 
(in particular, the importance of social capital in uncertain environments, where the rentability of other forms 
of capital is severely affected) or aspirations (post shock growth), or to evolutionary mechanisms that reward 
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in-group cooperation in intra-groups conflicts—however, the latter is mainly in relation to conflict related shocks 
and may be less relevant when the exposure is at the individual level (Bauer et al26). Nevertheless, Bogliacino, 
Gómez, and  Grimalda39 have assessed these mechanisms and found no support for them. They have thus specu-
lated that negative emotions may be the driving force in these situations, either because they impair cognitive 
performance, indirectly inducing more pro-sociality (Social Heuristics  Hypothesis40), or they may directly trig-
ger pro-sociality because the warm glow of giving undoes the unpleasant negative emotions  themselves41. This 
hypothesis is consistent with evidence from Bosman and  Widen42 and Joffily et al43, although both studies are 
correlational and not causal.
In this article, we present the results of a survey that we have conducted in order to study the effects of 
exposure to COVID-19 and the state of lockdown in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK), where a 
representative sample of the same participants has been followed starting from 24 April 2020, answering two 
questionnaires separated by one week (defined as wave one and wave two). In this paper, we present the results 
of these subjects who have answered wave two of the study, and for whom we also have the data from the base-
line survey conducted in wave one (starting on 24 April 2020). During both wave one and wave two, we have 
collected information on the exposure to shocks. In wave two, we have measured cognitive performance, and 
a set of preference traits (risk and time preferences, altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity) to assess 
whether or not they differ in people affected by negative shocks compared with people who were not affected. 
Additionally, by randomly assigning participants to a negative recall task, mildly reinforcing stress and negative 
emotions with respect to control recall (recalling neutral or joyful experiences), we use a difference-in-difference 
approach to assess to what extent, stress and negative affect may cause a change in cognitive functioning and 
preferences. Although this is a survey with unincentivized responses, both the instrument used to measure 
cognitive performance (the Cognitive Reflection Test) and preference traits (the Global Preference Survey) are 
experimentally  validated44,45.
The first key methodological choice of our research is the multiple measurements (in both wave one and wave 
two) of the exposure to shocks. We measure labor shocks as having suffered a negative change in earning or 
wage either the week before the first interview or the week before the current interview; stressful events shock as 
having suffered more than the median of the stressful events over the two weeks; health shocks as having visited 
a doctor, sought to be tested, or called the health service in response to COVID-19 or experienced severe stress, 
anxiety and depression in the previous week; economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock (hereafter, 
the label we use) as being predicted to be under severe stress, anxiety and depression conditional on economic 
vulnerability and negative events. The second methodological strength is the use of a randomized assignment 
to (placebo controlled) recall of negative emotions and stressful events. Treatment group one was asked to recall 
fearful or anxious events, treatment group two was asked to recall a stressful event, while the control group was 
asked to recall a neutral or joyful event.
On the basis of the review of the literature, we hypothesize that negative shocks hamper cognitive function, 
increase risk aversion and time discounting, and induce more pro-sociality than control. Our hypothesis is that 
stress and negative emotions drive these results: if this is the case, we expect negative emotions and stress recalls 
having a greater impact upon individuals exposed to shocks in comparison to those who are not exposed.
Results
In total, 4890 subjects participated in the wave two survey, from Italy (N = 1652), Spain (N = 1660), and the UK 
(N = 1578) over eight days between 2–9 May 2020. For all of these subjects, we matched the data from the first 
wave (one week earlier) to collect the measures of socio-demographics (age, gender, education, income, employ-
ment status, residential space, household size) and the measures of shocks. These shocks included the following: 
a measure of behavioral change as a response to COVID-19 (sought to be tested, called a doctor, visited a doctor, 
called the health service), a measure of stressful events (homeschooling, did not have enough food, etc., see SOM, 
Sect. 2, Q17), a measure of stress, anxiety and depression (see SOM, Sect. 2, Q26), and a measure of negative 
labor market shock (having been fired, a reduction in earnings, closure of the company, etc., see SOM, Sect. 2, 
Q27). Additionally, from our companion paper on the same  data46, we have a measure of the likelihood of being 
under stress, anxiety and depression, conditional on being economically vulnerable and having been exposed 
to a shock, using a machine learning algorithm.
For wave two, we have used the same scale of stress, anxiety and depression (SOM, Sect. 1, Q13) of a labor 
market shock (SOM, Sect. 1, Q14) and stressful events (SOM, Sect. 1, Q12), among the same group of participants.
We have computed the following dummies for exposure to shocks: labor shock—having suffered a reduction 
in earning or wage either the week before the first interview or the week before the current interview; stressful 
events shock—having suffered more than the median of the stressful events over the two weeks; health shock—
having carried out any of the actions in response to COVID-19 or having been under severe stress, anxiety and 
depression in the week before; and economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock—having been predicted 
to be under severe stress, anxiety and depression, conditional on economic vulnerability and negative shocks.
We use the following experimental treatments. In wave two, before answering any questions, the participants 
were administered a recall question. Treatment group one was asked to recall a fearful or anxious episode, treat-
ment group two was asked to recall a stressful event, and the control group was asked to recall either a neutral 
or a joyful event. We used both the joyful and neutral recall for two reasons: first, in case any of the shocks were 
particularly salient, it may be recalled as well in the neutral condition, which may harm having the correct control 
group (however, this turned out not to be a problem); and second, in case the statistical analysis of the recall 
showed causal effect, we can test for a false positive using the joy recall as a placebo experiment. These recalls are 
adapted from the literature on the effect of trauma and  violence15,47,48 (the phrasing is in SOM, Sect. 1, Recalls).
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After this initial question, participants were presented with three questions from the Cognitive Reflection 
Test and a set of experimentally validated questions to measure risk aversion, time discounting, altruism, trust, 
and positive and negative reciprocity. Besides risk aversion and time discounting, which we have already defined, 
the set of social preferences measures the following concepts: altruism—the willingness to sacrifice own payoff 
to the benefit of others in choices that are distributive and non-strategic; trust—the willingness to put material 
resources at the disposal of other persons; positive reciprocity—the willingness to face costs to repay actions that 
are motivated by good intentions; and negative reciprocity—the willingness to punish behavior that deviates from 
social norms. For the case of Altruism, we have two questions that can be used: the first asks for the share of a 
windfall endowment that the participant would be ready to share; the second asks for participant’s “willingness 
to share with others without expecting anything in return” on a Likert scale. Since we do not have reasons to 
prefer one or the other, we used both. For simplicity, they will be named Altruism 1 and Altruism 2, respectively.
In SOM, Sect. 3, Table S1, we report the dependent variables broken down by experimental conditions. In 
Column (5), we perform Pearson’s chi-squared test to assess whether or not we can treat joy recall and neutral 
recall together: indeed, we find that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference. In SOM, 
Sect. 3, Table 2, we present descriptive statistics broken down per experimental condition and a test of balancing 
of the covariates (column (6), Pearson’s chi-squared test): as expected, given random allocation, there are no 
systematic differences across experimental conditions for any of the covariates (age, gender, education, income, 
employment status, residential space, household size).
In the results that we are reporting, for the regression analysis of each dependent variable, we used the dummy 
for shocks as the main independent variable, we condition on the covariates and the two recalls of negative emo-
tions and stress, and we control for Multiple Hypotheses Testing estimating Romano and Wolff p-values (RW). 
In Fig. 1 below, we report the estimated effect size for the outcomes separately, for each of the four measures of 
shocks. We systematically detect a negative effect of shocks on cognitive performance, a positive effect on risk 
propensity and a positive effect on negative reciprocity. All of these effects are robust to Multiple Hypotheses Test-
ing, except for negative reciprocity with labor shock. For the cognitive performance, labor market shock reduces 
accuracy by − 0.1 of a standard deviation (t = − 3.20, RW = 0.013), health shock by − 0.17 of a standard deviation 
(t = − 5.70, RW = 0.000), stressful events shock by − 0.17 of a standard deviation (t = − 5.62, RW = 0.000), and 
economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock by − 0.18 of a standard deviation (t = − 6.18, RW = 0.000). 
For the risk propensity scale, labor market shock increases propensity by 0.21 of a standard deviation (t = 7.25, 
RW = 0.000), health shock by 0.12 of a standard deviation (t = 4.03, RW = 0.000), stressful events shock by 0.29 
of a standard deviation (t = 9.41, RW = 0.000), and economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock by 
0.11 of a standard deviation (t = 3.68, RW = 0.002). For negative reciprocity, labor market shock increases the 
propensity to punish a deviant behavior by 0.07 of a standard deviation (t = 2.16, RW = 0.164), health shock 
by 0.13 of a standard deviation (t = 4.32, RW = 0.000), stressful events shock by 0.16 of a standard deviation 
Figure 1.  Estimated effect size for the outcome variables and the four measures of shocks (confidence interval 
at 95%). Note. Source: longitudinal multi-country survey conducted in Italy (N = 1,652), Spain (N = 1,660) and 
the United Kingdom (N = 1,578). OLS Regressions with Romano-Wolff confidence interval. Outcomes: CRT 
is the three items Cognitive Reflection Test. Risk Taking measures how much the participant is willing to take 
risks; Time discounting the willingness to give up something today in order to benefit from that in the future; 
Trust is the propensity to assume that people have only the best intentions; Altruism 1 is the share of a windfall 
endowment that the participant would be ready to share; Altruism 2 is participant’s willingness to share with 
others without expecting anything in return; Positive reciprocity is the choice (among six options) of a thank-
you gift; Negative reciprocity is the willing to punish unfair behavior even if this is costly.
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(t = 5.09, RW = 0.000), and economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock by 0.12 of a standard devia-
tion (t = 3.88, RW = 0.002). Supporting regressions are reported in SOM, Sect. 3, Tables S3-S6. Stressful events’ 
shocks show an additional positive effect on patience (t = 3.66, RW = 0.004). However, neither health shock 
(t = 1.23, RW = 0.203), economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock (t = -0.98, RW = 0.701) nor labor 
shock (t = 2.02, RW = 0.203) show the same result.
To assess the hypothesis that stress and negative emotions are the causal mechanism behind these differences 
in cognitive performance and preferences after being exposed to a shock, we analyze the effect of the experimental 
manipulation. We performed difference-in-difference regressions: outcome variables are regressed over a dummy 
for shock, two dummies for negative emotions recall and stress recall, and a dummy for the interaction between 
shock and the negative emotions recall or the stress recall. All of the regressions include the standard covariates 
(age, gender, education, income, employment status, residential space, household size). The coefficient of interest 
is that of the interaction term: this should be interpreted as the difference in outcome between those recalling 
negative events and those recalling joyful or neutral events under shocks, with respect to the difference in out-
come between those recalling negative events and those recalling joyful or neutral events without having been 




















, where i is the subject, Y 
the outcome variable, tr and ctrl refers to the experimental conditions, 0 and 1 to the shock status, and X is our 
set of covariates). Data fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no negative affect or stress effect.
We report the results for the outcomes that differ according to exposure to shock: cognitive performance, risk 
aversion and negative reciprocity for all measures of shocks, and time discounting for stressful events’ shocks. For 
cognitive performance, the null hypothesis of the absence of effect of the recall in those suffering shocks com-
pared with those who did not, is not rejected when we use labor market shock (t = 1.02, RW = 0.904), health shock 
(t = − 1.06, RW = 0.897), stressful events shock (t = 0.63, RW = 0.91), and economic vulnerability predicted mental 
health shock (t = − 1.51, RW = 0.589). For risk propensity, we similarly cannot reject the null hypothesis when 
we use labor market shock (t = − 0.98, RW = 0.904), health shock (t = 0.35, RW = 0.998), stressful events shock 
(t = − 0.85, RW = 0.91), and economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock (t = 1.31, RW = 0.695). Finally, 
for negative reciprocity, we confirm the same finding when we use labor market shock (t = − 1.24, RW = 0.839), 
health shock (t = 0.01, RW = 0.998), stressful events shock (t = − 1.78, RW = 0.397), and economic vulnerability 
predicted mental health shock (t = 0.39, RW = 0.902). For the time discounting in case of stressful events shock, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis (t = − 1.03, RW = 0.886).
For the other outcome variables, regardless of the way we measure shocks, there is no significant interaction 
term. Supporting regressions are in SOM, Sect. 3, Tables S7-S10. In SOM, Tables S11-S14, we also report the 
regressions with the double interactions (shock times negative affect recall and shock times stress recall), where 
results do not change.
In Table 1 below, we summarize these findings.
Finally, we analyze whether there are differences between the three countries, and indeed we find some 
heterogeneity. In Fig. 2 below, we report the effect size per country in percentage of standard deviation, using 
stressful events as a measurement of shock. In Italy, shock reduces cognitive performance by − 0.14 of a standard 
deviation (t = − 2.34, RW = 0.079), increases risk propensity by 0.17 of a standard deviation (t = 2.87, RW = 0.019) 
and decreases altruism by − 0.15 of a standard deviation (t = − 2.42, RW = 0.077). In Spain, participants affected 
by shock have a higher risk propensity by 0.29 of a standard deviation (t = 5.56, RW = 0.000) and more negative 
reciprocity by 0.14 of a standard deviation (t = 2.57, RW = 0.058). In the UK, respondents affected by shock have 
a lower cognitive performance by − 0.23 of a standard deviation (t = − 4.51, RW = 0.000), a higher risk propensity 
by 0.28 of a standard deviation (t = 5.32, RW = 0.000), more altruism by 0.15 of a standard deviation (t = 2.72, 
RW = 0.032), and more negative reciprocity by 0.13 of a standard deviation (t = 2.42, RW = 0.077).
Results at the country level are less consistent across measures, especially in Italy. In fact, for example, labor 
shocks have qualitatively the same results, but are not statistically significant, and health shocks negatively affect 
cognitive functioning (t = − 2.45, RW = 0.094), whereas economic vulnerability predicted mental health shock 
does not correlate with changes in cognitive performance or preferences. This is less the case in Spain and in 
the UK. By looking at differences across countries, we should be cautious since the power is reduced for each 
test, since we are using just a portion of the sample. All supporting regressions are reported in SOM, Sect. 3, 
Tables S15-S17. In the same tables, we report the results of the difference-in-difference estimation. Again, data 
fail to reject the null hypothesis of no stress and negative emotions effects.
Discussion
In this article, we report results from a longitudinal multi-country study (Italy, Spain and the UK). We rand-
omized participants to recall fearful or stressful events and we measured exposure to labor market, health, or 
other types of shocks. As outcome variables, we measured cognitive function using the Cognitive Reflection Test 
and preferences traits using an experimentally validated set of questions on risk, time, and social preferences.
Regardless of how it was measured, we found that a negative shock predicted lower cognitive function, more 
risk aversion, and more propensity to punish (negative reciprocity). When we assessed the negative affect and 
stress hypothesis, we could not reject the null hypothesis of lack of an effect. Regarding the initial hypotheses, we 
confirmed the negative impact of shocks on cognitive performance and the positive impact on negative reciproc-
ity, but we found the opposite result than expected for risk propensity. One possibility is that the present context 
of the strong economic crisis is interpreted in terms of coping with risk in order to avoid losses, and this would 
be consistent with increasing loss aversion. However, it is worth noting that at least two studies have had a similar 
result as ours: a study of violence shock in Burundi finds an increase in risk  propensity23, and another study in 
India shows that betting increases in families according to the number of shocks that they have experienced 
(intensive margin)49. It is also possible that measures of risk aversion are domain specific and do not overlap 
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across decision contexts, in this case, the effect should be interpreted as a specific form of risk  propensity50,51. 
The findings reject the initial hypothesis that the effect of shocks on outcome variables is induced by negative 
emotions and stress. We have focused on this explanation because it parsimoniously predicts the effect of negative 
shocks on cognitive, time and risk preferences and social preferences. It is possible that the recall manipulation 
is too mild to generate an impact (there are obvious limitations in terms of what can be done within the ethi-
cal limits of experiments and the logistical limits of online surveys), so we cannot exclude that with stronger 
manipulations, the null hypothesis can be rejected.
As reviewed in the Introduction, there is quasi-experimental evidence that shows an increase in anti-social 
behavior (petty crimes and property crimes) after negative  shocks29–32, but those results do not contradict our 
results for two reasons: first, in the anti-social behavior literature, the results are mediated by weak institutions; 
second, an increase in anti-social behavior under shock is compatible with any set of preferences, simply if the 
opportunity costs of misbehaving for some individuals change dramatically.
Table 1.  Coefficients for the interaction terms for each of the shock variables per dependent variable. Each of 
the cells correspond to the coefficients and their standard errors in parenthesis from regressions, including an 
interaction term between shock and recalls, a dummy for shock and dummies for each of the recalls. (1)-(4) 
corresponds to different regressions, each one with the full set of covariates. Source: longitudinal multi-country 
survey conducted in Italy (N = 1,652), Spain (N = 1,660) and the United Kingdom (N = 1,578). OLS Regressions 
with Romano-Wolff confidence interval. Outcomes: CRT is the three items Cognitive Reflection Test. Risk 
Taking measures how much the participant is willing to take risks; Time discounting the willingness to give up 
something today in order to benefit from that in the future; Trust is the propensity to assume that people have 
only the best intentions; Altruism 1 is the share of a windfall endowment that the participant would be ready to 
share; Altruism 2 is participant’s willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return; Positive 
reciprocity is the choice (among six options) of a thank-you gift; Negative reciprocity is the willing to punish 
unfair behavior even if this is costly.
Variable CRT Risk Taking Time Discounting Trust Altruism 1 Altruism 2 Positive Reciprocity Negative Reciprocity
(1)
Shock # Recall 0.06 − 0.15 − 0.02 0.03 0 − 0.03 0.04 − 0.16
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.1) (0.13)
Labor Shock − 0.13*** 0.66*** 0.13 0.03 0 0.16 0.06 0.25**
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Recall (Neg. Emotions) − 0.06 − 0.01 0.06 − 0.14 0 0 0 0.13
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Recall (Stress) − 0.08 0.01 0.03 − 0.18 0 − 0.1 0 0.19*
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
(2)
Shock # Recall − 0.06 0.05 − 0.21* 0 0 − 0.09 − 0.03 0
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.1) (0.13)
Health Shock − 0.12** 0.27** 0.21** − 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.28***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Recall (Neg. Emotions) 0.01 − 0.13 0.18* − 0.13 0 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Recall (Stress) − 0.01 − 0.11 0.15 − 0.17 0.01 − 0.07 0.05 0.1
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.1)
(3)
Shock # Recall 0.04 − 0.13 − 0.12 − 0.09 − 0.01 − 0.30** − 0.08 − 0.23*
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.1) (0.13)
Stressful Events Shock − 0.19*** 0.83*** 0.29*** 0.18 0.01 0.33*** 0.09 0.49***
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11)
Recall (Neg. Emotions) − 0.04 − 0.03 0.12 − 0.07 0 0.16 0.07 0.17
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Recall (Stress) − 0.06 0 0.09 − 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.24**
(0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) (0.1)
(4)
Shock # Recall − 0.09 0.2 − 0.11 0.24* 0 0.08 − 0.08 0.05
(0.06) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14) (0.01) (0.14) (0.1) (0.13)
Economic Vulnerability Pre-
dicted Mental Health Shock − 0.12** 0.15 0.02 − 0.31*** 0 0.03 0.01 0.22**
(0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.01) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Recall (Neg. Emotions) 0.02 − 0.19* 0.1 − 0.26** 0 − 0.06 0.06 0.02
(0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.1) (0.01) (0.11) (0.08) (0.1)
Recall (Stress) 0 − 0.17 0.07 − 0.29*** 0 − 0.16 0.06 0.08
(0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.1) (0.01) (0.11) (0.08) (0.1)
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This study has implications for the literature on the study of shocks because it provides evidence with plausible 
external validity, which complements the results of experiments where shocks are randomly administered but in 
a less externally valid  setting19. If we assume that preferences have an idiosyncratic component which is subject 
to shocks, we show what is the direction of the effect of those shocks, and this has important implications for the 
literature on endogenous  preferences52, the classic claim of which is that institutional settings have long-term 
implications for the evolution of values and tastes. Of course, we are not able to claim yet that this change is long 
term, but this is certainly an important question for future studies. Exposure to shock is heterogeneous both 
in intensity and diffusions but is reasonably common: the fact that cognitive performance and preferences are 
shaped by this experience may have important consequences for how we model the evolution of our societies. 
Finally, it has important implications in terms of public health: the current pandemic and the mitigation strate-
gies (lockdowns) have produced significant consequences in terms of labor market and health shocks, and it is 
important to provide creative policy solutions for the future and to anticipate these changes, in the design of a 
future response to pandemics. An important strength of this study is that we were able to separately analyze the 
effect of inducing stress or negative emotions, the effect of having suffered a shock, and the combination of the 
two. By providing an exogenous source of variation through experimental conditions, this design controls for 
confounding factors and is better suited to an analysis of causal impact.
As usual, this study has some limitations. Ideally, one should measure cognitive performance and elicit 
preferences using induced value  theory53,54. Without properly incentivized tasks, responses can be noisier, and 
this may reduce the statistical  power55. Nevertheless, the use of experimentally validated questions is a strength 
of this study and suggests strong construct validity; also, at least for CRT, monetary incentives do not impact 
 performance56. Notice also that CRT carries over the boundaries of a measurement of cognitive abilities and 
thinking  dispositions57. Nevertheless, it correlates with many other measures of cognitive  performance44, and 
predict performance in many heuristics-and-biases  tasks57.
The three countries under examination (Italy, Spain and the UK) are considered to be countries that have 
mismanaged the overall pandemic; thus, one may wonder to what extent these results are generalizable to 
countries where the shock has been dealt with more efficiently. However, Italy, Spain, and the UK are also the 
countries in Europe where the pandemic and the lockdown have had the strongest impacts, and this suggests 
that confounding factors are less salient in driving the results of the effect of shocks. Current findings therefore 
Figure 2.  Estimated effect size of stressful events on the outcome variables by country (confidence interval at 
95%). Note. Source: longitudinal multi-country survey conducted in Italy (N = 1,652), Spain (N = 1,660) and 
the United Kingdom (N = 1,578). OLS Regressions with Romano-Wolff confidence interval. Outcomes: CRT 
is the three items Cognitive Reflection Test. Risk Taking measures how much the participant is willing to take 
risks; Time discounting the willingness to give up something today in order to benefit from that in the future; 
Trust is the propensity to assume that people have only the best intentions; Altruism 1 is the share of a windfall 
endowment that the participant would be ready to share; Altruism 2 is participant’s willingness to share with 
others without expecting anything in return; Positive reciprocity is the choice (among six options) of a thank-
you gift; Negative reciprocity is the willing to punish unfair behavior even if this is costly.
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contribute significantly to the existing literature that examines how people respond to difficult and emerging 
times, whereby the current COVID-19 situation is an extraordinarily strong example.
Materials and methods
We submit a link to a random sample of participants to an online panel in three countries: Italy, Spain, and the 
UK. The study is preregistered on OSF: https ://bit.ly/2WjzO Ue. The English version of the questionnaire can be 
found in the Supplementary Online Materials, Sect. 1. Ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review 
Board of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. All respondents provided informed consent. All methods were 
performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations by Nature Scientific Reports.
All participants answered two online questionnaires over the course of two weeks. The wave one questionnaire 
included socio-demographics, self-reported health status, labor market status, and exposure to shock (SOM, 
Sect. 2 Questions 1–13, 18–21, 27, 24–26). Wave one is described and analyzed in Codagnone et al46. All ques-
tions are standardized and psychometrically validated.
Those participants who agreed to take part in wave two were randomly assigned to four conditions: Recall 
of Negative Emotions, Recall of Stress, Recall of Positive Emotion, Neutral Recall (SOM, Sect. 1, Recalls). The 
phrasing is taken from Callen et al48 and Bogliacino et al15, and adjusted with COVID-19 and lockdown related 
examples. The assignment criterion is the following: 30% is assigned to Recall of Negative Emotions, 30% to 
Recall of Stress, 20% to Recall of Positive Emotions, and 20% to Neutral Recall. The recall is shown just before 
answering the outcome variable questions.
Outcome variables are cognitive performance and preference traits. Cognitive performance is measured 
through a three-questions version of the Cognitive Reflection  Test44 (SOM, Sect. 1, Questions 1–3). Risk and 
time preferences, altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity are measured through the Falk et al45 Global 
Preference Survey (SOM, Sect. 1, Questions 4–10).
Exposure to shock is measured in the following way: labor market shock—having suffered a change in wage 
or earnings over the previous two weeks; stressful events shock—having suffered more than the median of the 
stressful events over the previous two weeks; health shock—having carried out any of the actions in response to 
COVID-19 or having been under severe stress, anxiety and depression the week before; and economic vulnerabil-
ity predicted mental health shock—being predicted to be under severe stress, anxiety and depression conditional 
on economic vulnerability and negative shocks. To estimate the relationship between the factors of economic vul-
nerability and exposure to negative economic shocks and stress, anxiety and depression, a random forest model is 
used, with bootstrapping (550 iterations). The following are the predictors used in the model: household income, 
a dummy for unemployed, a dummy for homeownership, living space, household size, number of children of 
school age, financial buffer stock, negative events that occurred in the previous week, and change in income or 
earnings (SOM, Sect. 2, Wave 1 Questionnaire, Q5, Q7, Q9, Q10, Q11, Q13, Q17a/b/c/d/e/f/h/i, Q27)46.
We analyze data using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors, with the fol-
lowing covariates: age, sex, education, income, employment status, residence space, household size. We control 
for Multiple Hypotheses Testing using Romano and Wolff standard  errors58.
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